Year: 2012
Type: dissertation
Abstract: Combinatorial auctions allow buyers to express preferences over bun- dles of items. The Primal-Dual (PD) auction developed by de Vries et al. (2007) is an efficient ascending combinatorial auction which, given certain conditions on buyers valuations, achieves Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) payments. The Universal Competitive Equilibrium (UCE) auction by Mishra and Parkes (2007) is a generalization of the PD auction and achieves VCG payments under more general valuations. This study compares the PD and the UCE auction with respect to seller revenue and the number of iterations required to reach equilibrium. Simulations are performed for a xed number of items over dierent levels of competition. The results indicate that for some numbers of buyers, the UCE auction yields slightly less revenue. There does not seem to be any dierence in the number of iterations before termination.
Author: David Nordström
Language: English
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W270967516