The Lisbon Treaty and the Future of EU Enlargement
Year: 2008
Type: article
Abstract: Due to asymmetry in competencies of the so-called institutional triangle formed by the European Parliament (EP), the Commission, and the Council of the European Union, the signifi cance of the Council as the sole legislative institution and at the same time the sole institution based on the intergovernmental principle, is highly considerable. Stemming from this fact, the interest of each member state is to achieve the highest possible infl uence within this institution. Logically then, the behaviour of all relevant actors is subdued to this goal and these actors seek the optimal tools in order to achieve it (Spence 2004: 256–258). Currently, there are three voting modalities for decision making in the Council – unanimous voting, simple majority voting and qualifi ed majority voting (QMV). Due to the enlarging scope of issues where QMV applies, this modality is the most discussed one while reforming the functioning of the EU. As of the Rome Treaty, through the Single European Act until the (future) ratifi cation of the Lisbon Treaty, the basic functioning of QMV has been that each member state possesses a certain, exactly defi ned number of votes. The weighing and (re-)distribution of these votes has been one of the hottest issues during each round of enlargement of the EU (Westlake and Galloway 2004: 190–192). The Lisbon Treaty, signed in December 2007, now under ratifi cation in member states, changes this voting principle dramatically. The new rules, to be applied from 01 November 2014 or 01 April 2017, depending of the will of the member states, can be without exaggeration termed as a rupture.
Author: Jana Hynkova-Dvoranova
Language: English
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2726575316
