Work

Prosocial Learning Agents Solve Generalized Stag Hunts Better than Selfish Ones

Year: 2018
Type: conference-paper
Abstract: Real world interactions are full of coordination problems [2, 3, 8, 14, 15] and thus constructing agents that can solve them is an important problem for artificial intelligence research. One of the simplest, most heavily studied coordination problems is the matrixform, two-player Stag Hunt. In the Stag Hunt, each player makes a choice between a risky action (hunt the stag) and a safe action (forage for mushrooms). Foraging for mushrooms always yields a safe payoff while hunting yields a high payoff if the other player also hunts but a very low payoff if one shows up to hunt alone. This game has two important Nash equilibria: either both players show up to hunt (this is called the payoff dominant equilibrium) or both players stay home and forage (this is called the risk-dominant equilibrium [7]).
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2754718400
FWCI: 19.37
Cites: 69
Cited by: 140
Related to: 10