Work

Teleological Explanation: Why We Answer “Why?” the Way We Do

Year: 2003
Type: article
Abstract: Seeking explanations is a fundamental part of everyday cognitive life. Many accounts of concepts and naive theories have correspondingly placed explanation at the center of conceptual representation. Concepts for which we have an underlying explanation are learned more efficiently (e.g. Spalding & Murphy, 1999) and said to gain conceptual coherence (Murphy & Medin, 1985) and embody systematic sets of beliefs (Keil, 1989). Similarly, causal-explanatory principles are thought to ground our naive theories of physics, psychology, and biology (e.g. Carey, 1985). Despite the prevalence of explanation as both an everyday behavior and a theoretical construct, there are many open questions about its cognitive basis. For example, why do we apply certain kinds of explanations selectively? Here we summarize three experiments investigating the conditions under which adults accept teleological explanations (TEs) — explanations in terms of a function or goal. Specifically, we examine whether the domain of what’s being explained, the causal role of the function being invoked in the explanation, and the familiarity of the causal process influence TE acceptance. While previous work suggests that adults restrict TEs on the basis of domain (Kelemen, 1999), we predicted that TEs would be accepted whenever the function invoked in the explanation played a causal role in bringing about what was being explained, consistent with Wright’s (1976) philosophical analysis.
Institution: Harvard University
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2767697552
FWCI:
Cites: 7
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Related to: 10