Year: 2017
Type: conference-paper
Abstract: In this paper, we model and study how adding a battery can change the ask strategies of a REP and its revenue. Some of our key observations are: ● Necessary condition: We find that, as a necessary condition, the battery depreciation cost must be smaller than the DA market prices to incentivize a REP to use a battery. This necessary condition does not hold with the current battery and market prices. This can change if the battery prices decrease and/or the energy prices in the DA market increase. Alternatively, the grid operator or market owners can subsidize battery costs for REPs. ● Market rules: Under the assumption that batteries are financially viable, the REP might manipulate the market, using the batteries not only to hedge against their unpredictability but also to make profit by submitting non-truthful asks. To avoid that, market owners must restrict the maximum allowable battery size for each REP, which is dependent on their forecasting error. ● Market pricing schemes: The maximum allowable battery size under which a REP does not manipulate the market is also a function of market pricing schemes. Batteries, in general, make REP operators less conservative in their ask strategies and lean them towards over-asking. Therefore, a truthful ask strategy depends on the penalty to buy energy in the RT market. Therefore, market owners can allow the use of batteries if they increase penalty prices in the RT market as compared to DA prices. If all of these settings are properly designed, the truthful ask is more stable to the drifts of market prices.
Authors: Yashar Ghiassi, Wolfgang Ketter, John Collins
Institutions: University of Cologne, Pennsylvania State University
Language: English
Subfield: Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Field: Engineering
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2769735834
