Year: 2017
Type: conference-paper
Abstract: Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) provides a strongly isolated memory space, known as an enclave, for a user process, ensuring confidentiality and integrity against software and hardware attacks. Even the operating system and hypervisor cannot access the enclave because of the hardware-level isolation. Further, hardware attacks are neither able to disclose plaintext data from the enclave because its memory is always encrypted nor modify it because its integrity is always verified using an integrity tree. When the processor detects any integrity violation, it locks itself to prevent further damages; that is, a system reboot is necessary. The processor lock seems a reasonable solution against such a powerful hardware attacker; however, if a software attacker has a way to trigger integrity violation, the lock could result in a severe denial-of-service (DoS) attack.
Authors: Yeongjin Jang, Jaehyuk Lee, Sangho Lee, Taesoo Kim
Language: English
Subfield: Hardware and Architecture
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: bronze
Funders: National Science Foundation, Intel Corporation, Facebook, Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute, National Research Foundation of Korea, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Korea Evaluation Institute of Industrial Technology, Institute for Information and Communications Technology Promotion, Office of Naval Research
Awards: SaTC-EDU: EAGER: Big Data and Security: Educating the Next-Generation Security Analysts, G3337934819, G3371991119, CI-P: Collaborative: Planning for a Community-Driven Open Research Infrastructure to Support Secure Computing Research involving Intel SGX, G5199875135, G5648561504, G5718616599, G5869452329, G6486092784, SaTC: CORE: Medium: Understanding and Fortifying Machine Learning Based Security Analytics, TWC: Medium: Collaborative: Systems, Tools, and Techniques for Executing, Managing, and Securing SGX Programs
OpenAlex ID: W2769824527
