Year: 2016
Type: article
Abstract: The current orthodoxy in cognitive science, what I describe as\na commitment to deep representationalism, faces intractable\nproblems. If we take these objections seriously, and I will\nargue that we should, there are two possible responses: 1. We\nare mistaken that representation is the locus of our cognitive\ncapacities — we manage to be the successful cognitive agents\nin some other, non-representational, way; or, 2. Our\nrepresentational capacities do give us critical cognitive\nadvantages, but they are not fundamental to us qua human\nbeings. As Andy Clark has convincingly argued, anti-\nrepresentationalism, option one, is explanatorily weak.\nConsequently, I will argue, we need to take the second option\nseriously. In the first half of the paper I rehearse the problems\nwith the current representational view and in the second half of\nthe paper I defend and give a positive sketch of a two-systems\nview of cognition – a non-representational perceptual system\ncoupled with a representational language-dependent one – and\nlook at some consequences of the view.
Author: Nancy Salay
Language: English
Subfield: Cognitive Neuroscience
Field: Neuroscience
Domain: Life Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2786311470
