Work

Law Enforcement under Incomplete Law: Theory and Evidence from Financial Market Regulation

Year: 2002
Type: book
Abstract: This Paper studies the design of lawmaking and law enforcement institutions based on the premise that law is inherently incomplete. Under incomplete law, law enforcement by courts may suffer from deterrence failure. As a potential remedy, a regulatory regime is introduced. The major functional difference between courts and regulators is that courts enforce law reactively, that is only once others have initiated law enforcement procedures, while regulators enforce law proactively, i.e. on their own initiative. We study optimal regime selection between a court and a regulatory regime and present evidence from the history of financial market regulation.
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2790647166
FWCI: 6.116
Cites: 22
Cited by: 37
Related to: 10