Year: 2024
Type: preprint
Abstract: We model merger control procedures as a process of sequential acquisition of information in which mergers can be cleared after a ?first phase of investigation. We fi?nd that the enforceability of clearance decisions at the end of the fi?rst phase is unattractive to the extent that it prevents the authorities to use their expectations as to whether evidence gathered in the fi?rst phase will be confi?rmed in the second phase. This deprives the ?first phase of its potential as an effective screening mechanism. We also fi?nd that when clearance decisions in the fi?rst phase are enforceable, a different (higher) standard in the fi?rst phase is only desirable when Phase I decisions are captured by merging parties (as opposed to complainants).
Authors: Langus, Gregor, Lipatov, Vilen, Neven, Damien
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2797374137