Evolving Enactivism. Basic Minds Meet Content, de DANIEL D. HUTTO AND ERIK MYIN, CAMBRIDGE, MA, MIT PRESS, 2017, xxvii + 328 pp
Year: 2018
Type: review
Abstract: After the publication of their first manifesto [Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Contents (2013)], which served to set up the basis of what Hutto and Myin [H&M hereafter] consider a radical approach to the embodied cognition, Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content (2017) aims to develop the next steps of H&M's philosophical program.Grounded on an explicit commitment to explanatory naturalism [see Chapter 1], the argument that originally motivates Radical Enactivism [aka "REC"] is the so-called "Hard Problem of Content" [pp.41-53; see also Hutto & Myin (2013), Chapter 4].The Hard Problem of Content, H&M claim, makes whatever theory that posits representational contents at the basis of cognition naturalistically intractable.Put bluntly, the problem is that no theory of information based on biological functions or causal covariances can explain how organisms can gather information from the environment in order to represent and manipulate it.If H&M are right, that cognition is always and everywhere representationally-driven is an unjustified and unexplained assumption.Nonetheless, two caveats need to be considered here.First, as H&M warn us [p.89], we should avoid the temptation of reading the Hard Problem of Content as an attempt to deny that any form of cognition involves contents.Instead, REC defends a more nuanced thesis: it holds that content-involving cognition is a special achievement, and therefore denies that representation and information-processing are essential features of all forms of cognition.Second, we should not see REC as a completely new, alternative version of enactivism that tries to develop its own explanatory tools.Rather, H&M conceive of REC as a theoretical project that aims to move "philosophy and science ahead by making well-targeted adjustments to familiar ways of conceiving of mind and cognition" [p.xii].Part of the positive program of REC is thereby built on its discussion with other embodied theories of cognition.Chapters 3 and 4 aim to put this positive program in action.They do so by engaging on a philosophical analysis of Predictive Processing
Author: Miguel Segundo Ortín
Language: English
Subfield: Cognitive Neuroscience
Field: Neuroscience
Domain: Life Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2797394099
