Work

Vagueness, logic and the computational view of mind /

Year: 1988
Type: article
Abstract: it is d i f f i c u l t to r e ject (1) or a c cept (3) without s e rio u s l y altering som e of our basic a ttitudes and beliefs.But this leaves us either to deny (2> or to ques t i o n our belief that modus ponens is trut h -p r e s e r v i n g (at least in natural language).This latter o p tion seems unappealing, but on the other hand, d e n y i n g <2> implies that th e r e are two consecutive cards, o b s e r v a t i o n s l l y indistinguishable in color, yet such that o n e is blue and the other is not.This is certa i n l y not in k eeping with our o r d inary use of this pr e d i c a t e and raises seri o u s q uestions about our use of, and bel i e f s about, some of our most common linguistic items.It is widely agreed that the s o urce of the dif f i c u l t y is caused by the vagueness of 'blue'.Numer o u s philosophers, including Dummett (1975), Putnam 1983), Unger (1979aUnger ( , 1979bUnger ( , 1980aUnger ( , 1980b) ) and Wright (1975), h ave argued tha t vagueness f o rces upon us va r io u s conclusions, most notably in the areas of metap h y s i c s and logic.But vagueness is not of Interest only to p h i l o s o p h e r s -artificial intelligence resear c h e r s such as Winograd ( 1985) and Barwise and Perry (1985) have noted that capturing the " looseness" of a p p l i c a b i l i t y of such predicates has been, over the past t h irty years, an enormous and as-yet unsolved
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2800509947
FWCI:
Cites: 34
Cited by:
Related to: 10