Year: 2013
Type: article
Abstract: This thesis examines the relationship between dierent aspects of governance and economic outcomes.In particular, it studies the relation between bureaucratic corruption and rm performance; one mechanism to reduce entry barriers; and the propensity of countries to experience scal and political stress events.In the rst chapter I focus on bureaucratic corruption and examine how it aects the performance of rm in Central and Eastern European countries.While most previous research relies solely on data from the BEEPS (Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey), which suers from excessive non-reporting of rm performance, I Preface This thesis examines the relationship between dierent aspects of governance and economic outcomes.In particular, it studies the relation between bureaucratic corruption and rm performance; one mechanism to reduce entry barriers; and the propensity of countries to experience scal and political stress events.In the developing world, corruption, presumably, is among the most traumatic weaknesses of governance.It is considered a heavy constraint to the economic functioning of countries, and their growth and development.Leaving aside grand and legislative forms of corruption (Jain, 2001), in the rst chapter of this thesis I focus on bureaucratic corruption as a hindrance to private sector development.I empirically examine how it aects rm performance in Central and Eastern European countries.I thereby contribute to the ongoing debate about two opposing consequences of corruption on economic performance.Previous research on this topic relies mostly on data from the BEEPS (Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey), which suers from excessive non-reporting of rm performance characteristics.To mitigate this problem, I combine the data on bribery practices from the BEEPS with large, reliable rm performance data from the Amadeus database.Focusing on within-rm variation, I nd that a higher bribery level negatively aects both the sales and labor productivity growth of rms.Nevertheless, conditional on a given level of bureaucratic corruption in a narrowly dened local market, a higher unevenness of rms' bribing behavior within such a market appears to facilitate rm performance.This result implies that in more uneven local markets, negative externalities from bureaucratic corruption are negligible.Bribery helps favored rms and/or those with greater willingness to pay to overcome operational and growth constraints.Nonbribing rms in such environments seem to be more ecient in production and growth, so that both types of rms generate increasing growth rates on average.The chance to Chapter 1The Impact of Bribery on Firm Performance: Evidence from Central and Eastern European Countries
Source: ASEP
Author: Anna Kochanova
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
Awards: G8106460475, G997307642
OpenAlex ID: W2802340806