Work

Formal Security Proof of CMAC and Its Variants

Year: 2018

Type: conference-paper

Abstract: The CMAC standard, when initially proposed by Iwata and Kurosawa as OMAC1, was equipped with a complex game-based security proof. Following recent advances in formal verification for game-based security proofs, we formalize a proof of unforgeability for CMAC in EasyCrypt. A side effects of this proof are improvements of EasyCrypt libraries. This formal proof obtains security bounds very similar to Iwata and Kurosawa's for CMAC, but also proves secure a certain number of intermediate constructions of independent interest, including ECBC, FCBC and XCBC. This work represents one more step in the direction of obtaining a reliable set of independently verifiable evidence for the security of international cryptographic standards.

Source: IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW)

DOI: 10.1109/csf.2018.00014

Authors: Cecile Baritel-Ruet, Francois Dupressoir, Pierre-Alain Fouque, Benjamin Gregoire

Institutions: Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies du numérique, Centre Inria d'Université Côte d'Azur, University of Surrey, Institut Universitaire de France, Université de Rennes

Language: English

Topic: Cryptographic Implementations and Security

Subfield: Artificial Intelligence

Field: Computer Science

Domain: Physical Sciences

Open Access status: green

Funders: Agence Nationale de la Recherche, Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council

Awards: Academic Centre of Excellence in Cyber Security Research - University of Surrey, Securing the Future Internet with TLS 1.3, Academic Centre of Excellence in Cyber Security Research - University of Surrey