Aristotle on the Structure of Akratic Action
Year: 2018
Type: article
Abstract: I argue that, for Aristotle, akratic actions are against one’s general commitment to act in accordance with one’s correct conception of one’s ends overall. Only some akratic actions are also against one’s correct decision to perform a particular action. This thesis explains Aristotle’s views on impetuousakrasia, weakakrasia, stubborn opinionated action and inverseakrasia. In addition, it sheds light on Aristotle’s account of practical rationality. Rational actions are coherent primarily with one’s commitments to one’s conception of the good and only secondarily with one’s decisions to perform a particular action.
Source: Phronesis
Author: Elena Cagnoli Fiecconi
Institution: Van Leer Jerusalem Institute
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2804254241
