Perceptual non-evidential knowledge : an epistemology of perception from an Austinian perspective
Year: 2017
Type: dissertation
Abstract: The topic of this thesis is perceptual propositional knowledge. More specifically, the guiding question of this thesis will be, how do perceptual experiences figure in making knowledge of our environment available to perceivers? In general terms, the proposal that will be defended throughout this work is that perception figures as a source of reasons which can ground empirical knowledge. More specifically, we will defend the view that our perceptual awareness of the concrete entities which populate the world – entities such as blueberries, cats, the blueberry’s colour, the cat eating the blueberry, rainbows, shadows, etc. – affords us with reasons which have the potential to ground knowledge about those entities. The position I will be defending here has not received much attention in recent philosophical discussion. One of the things this thesis is set to achieve is to show that the relatively little attention this view has received is not justified. We will see that once the view has been fleshed out there are several discussions in the contemporary debate on perceptual knowledge which would benefit from engaging with the conception defended here – for the view can serve as the basis to advance original solutions to traditional problems.
Authors: Anaya Ruiz Esparza, José Alfonso
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
Funder: University of Warwick
OpenAlex ID: W2806266813