Börsenzulassungsstellen, Reichsregierung und die (Selbst-)Regulierung der Mehrstimmrechtsaktie, 1919-1937
Year: 2018
Type: article
Abstract: The German system of corporate governance changed considerably after the end of the Great War. This change was, among other things, marked by the rise of shares with multiple voting rights, often concentrated in the hands of incumbent business leaders. The development was publicly criticized by the promoters of a more equal corporate constitution and led the Imperial government as well as stock exchanges to consider reform. The article traces this debate based on source material from the Bundesarchiv and the Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz. In doing so, I find that, contrary to John Coffee’s claim, public regulation followed the practice of private regulation until the late 1920s but that the latter was dismissed as a role model during the Great Depression. The quantitative evidence furthermore shows that public as well as private actors achieved their regulatory targets. Yet, these targets did not include the full removal of shares with multiple voting rights.
Author: Felix Selgert
Institution: University of Bonn
Language: English
Subfield: Accounting
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid:
OpenAlex ID: W2809605941