Year: 2018
Type: conference-paper
Abstract: Memory-corruption attacks have been subject to extensive research in the latest decades.Researchers demonstrated sophisticated attack techniques, such as (just-intime/blind) return-oriented programming and counterfeit object-oriented programming, which enable the attacker to execute arbitrary code and data-oriented attacks that are commonly used for privilege escalation.At the same time, the research community proposed a number of effective defense techniques.In particular, control-flow integrity (CFI), code-pointer integrity (CPI), and finegrained code randomization are effective mitigation techniques against code-reuse attacks.All of these techniques require strong memory isolation.For example, CFI's shadow stack, CPI's safe-region, and the randomization secret must be protected from adversaries able to perform arbitrary read-write accesses.In this paper we propose IMIX, a lightweight, inprocess memory isolation extension for the Intel-based x86 CPUs.Our solution extends the x86 ISA with a new memory-access permission to mark memory pages as security sensitive.These memory pages can then only be accessed with a newly introduced instruction.Unlike previous work, IMIX is not tailored towards a specific defense (technique) but can be leveraged as a primitive to protect the data of a wide variety of memory-corruption defenses.We provide a proof of concept of IMIX using Intel's Simulation and Analysis Engine.We extend Clang/LLVM to include our new instruction, and enhance CPI by protecting CPI's safe region using IMIX.
Institution: Technische Universität Darmstadt
Language: English
Subfield: Hardware and Architecture
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2883797314
