Year: 2018
Type: article
Abstract: ABSTRACT In this paper I will be concerned with the relationship between pragmatic encroachment and the rational instability of belief. I will be concerned to make five points: first, that some defenders of pragmatic encroachment are indeed committed to predictable rational instability of belief; second, that rational instability is indeed troublesome – particularly when it is predictable; third, that the bare thesis of pragmatic encroachment is not committed to rational instability of belief at all; fourth, that the view that Jake Ross and I have called the ‘reasoning disposition’ account of belief has the right structure to predict limited and stable pragmatic encroachment on the rationality of belief; and fifth and finally, that the very best cases for pragmatic encroachment are rationally stable in the right ways.
Source: Episteme
DOI: 10.1017/epi.2018.24
Author: Mark Schroeder
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2884513052