Year: 2018
Type: preprint
Abstract: In this paper, we compute $ε$-approximate Nash equilibria in atomic splittable polymatroid congestion games with convex Lipschitz continuous cost functions. The main approach relies on computing a pure Nash equilibrium for an associated integrally-splittable congestion game, where players can only split their demand in integral multiples of a common packet size. It is known that one can compute pure Nash equilibria for integrally-splittable congestion games within a running time that is pseudo-polynomial in the aggregated demand of the players. As the main contribution of this paper, we decide for every $ε>0$, a packet size $k_ε$ and prove that the associated $k_ε$-splittable Nash equilibrium is an $ε$-approximate Nash equilibrium for the original game. We further show that our result applies to multimarket oligopolies with decreasing, concave Lipschitz continuous price functions and quadratic production costs: there is a polynomial time transformation to atomic splittable polymatroid congestion games implying that we can compute $ε$-approximate Cournot-Nash equilibria within pseudo-polynomial time.
Source: arXiv (Cornell University)
Authors: Harks, Tobias, Timmermans, Veerle
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2887630385