Year: 2014
Type: article
Abstract: We first met the core ideas of disjunctivism through the teaching and writing of Pascal Engel 1 .At the time, the view seemed to us as being clearly false, despite the fact that it opened new epistemological avenues, especially as far as the skeptical challenge was concerned.Today, we think that a nuanced assessment of disjunctivism is within reach.In order to defend such an assessment, we will first put forward a distinction between two aspects of the disjunctivist position, epistemological disjunctivism and metaphysical disjunctivism 2 .Epistemological disjunctivism 3 bears on the characteristics of perceptual knowledge; we will claim that it is neutral regarding the nature of perceptual experience.Metaphysical disjunctivism, on the other hand, is a view about the metaphysical nature of perceptual experience.Its main claim is that perceptual experiences are of a relational nature: the existence of conscious experiences depends on the existence of their worldly objects 4 .In order to give a first illustration of this distinction, let us consider two cases, a good case and a bad one.In the good case, a subject, let's say Mary, is seeing a red
Authors: Pascal Ludwig, Émile Thalabard
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2887905590