Year: 1996
Type: report
Abstract: ABSTR4CTWhen should a government provide a service inhouse and when should it contract out provision?We develop a model in which the provider can invest in improving the quality of service or reducing cost, If contracts are incomplete, the private provider has a stronger incentive to engage in both quality improvement and cost reduction than a government employee.However, the private contractor's incentive to engage in cost reduction is typically too strong because he ignores the adverse effect on non-contractible quality.The model is applied to understanding the costs and benefits of prison privatization.
DOI: 10.3386/w5744
Authors: Oliver Hart, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny
Institutions: Harvard University, University of Chicago
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
Funder: National Science Foundation
OpenAlex ID: W2891722522
