Work

Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq

Year: 2011

Type: article

Abstract: We develop and test an economic theory of insurgency motivated by the informal literature and by recent military doctrine. We model a three-way contest between violent rebels, a government seeking to minimize violence by mixing service provision and coercion, and civilians deciding whether to share information about insurgents. We test the model using panel data from Iraq on violence against Coalition and Iraqi forces, reconstruction spending, and community characteristics (sectarian status, socioeconomic grievances, and natural resource endowments). Our results support the theory’s predictions: improved service provision reduces insurgent violence, particularly for smaller projects and since the “surge” began in 2007.

Source: Journal of Political Economy

DOI: 10.1086/661983

Authors: Eli Berman, Jacob N. Shapiro, Joseph H. Felter

Institutions: University of California San Diego, Princeton University, Stanford University

Language: English

Topic: Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East

Subfield: Political Science and International Relations

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: green