Year: 2018
Type: article
Abstract: Locke's commentators are divided about whether Locke thinks that the idea of a person is a substance idea or a mode idea. I use Locke's theory of kinds to argue for an intermediate interpretation on which the idea of a person is a substance idea that contains a mode idea. As a result, while proponents of the substance interpretation correctly claim that ‘person’ designates a kind of substance, proponents of the mode interpretation are nonetheless correct in insisting that mode ideas play an important role in Locke's account of persons and personal identity.
Source: Pacific philosophical quarterly
DOI: 10.1111/papq.12255
Author: Matthew A. Leisinger
Institution: Yale University
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2894693188