Work

Time Protection

Year: 2019

Type: conference-paper

Abstract: Timing channels enable data leakage that threatens the security of computer systems, from cloud platforms to smartphones and browsers executing untrusted third-party code. Preventing unauthorised information flow is a core duty of the operating system, however, present OSes are unable to prevent timing channels. We argue that OSes must provide time protection, the temporal equivalent of the established memory protection, for isolating security domains. We examine the requirements of time protection, present a design and its implementation in the seL4 microkernel, and evaluate efficacy and cost on x86 and Arm processors.

DOI: 10.1145/3302424.3303976

Authors: Qian Ge, Yuval Yarom, Tom Chothia, Gernot Heiser

Institutions: Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation, UNSW Sydney, Data61, The University of Adelaide, University of Birmingham

Language: English

Topic: Security and Verification in Computing

Subfield: Artificial Intelligence

Field: Computer Science

Domain: Physical Sciences

Open Access status: green

Funders: Intel Corporation, Department of Defence, Australian Government, Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council

Award: G8682795926

OpenAlex ID: W2897494537

FWCI: 3.346

Cites: 66

Cited by: 60

Related to: 10