Year: 2019
Type: preprint
Abstract: Philosophers have usually dealt with the problem of consciousness but, in the last decades, neurobiologists have undertaken the daunting task to address it scientifically. In particular, to answer how the brain produces consciousness. Here we question whether it actually does so, seeking to articulate the precise relation between neural activity and subjective experience. There is no doubt that they are intimately related. However, we argue that the thesis of parallelism (that consciousness tells no more than what is going on in the brain, but only in a different language), rather than enunciating an empirical fact, betrays a philosophical commitment. In addition, such equivalence between mental and cerebral states can be shown to lead to self-contradictions (the brain produces the world with itself in it; the brain, as an object in conscious experience, gives rise to conscious experience). Our approach endorses an integration of philosophical and scientific efforts where the scientist seeks to obtain empirically expedient answers to questions that the philosopher has previously formulated in a conceptually precise manner. Namely, that the questions we ask warrant the answers we provide. We posit that the success of an interdisciplinary quest for consciousness hinges on two more challenges: to accept negative proofs as ways forward and, especially, to avoid presenting metaphysical positions as scientific results. Differentiating between solidarity (as brain lesions demonstrate) and equivalence (as no data does) offers an alternative point of departure for understanding consciousness that does not, from the outset, outlay a false problem. The “easy problem” is hard-enough for the “hard problem” to be ill-posed.
Authors: Alex Gomez‐Marin, Juan Arnau
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2912294758
