Work

Blockchain Mining Games with Pay Forward

Year: 2019

Type: conference-paper

Abstract: We study the strategic implications that arise from adding one extra option to the miners participating in the bitcoin protocol. We propose that when adding a block, miners also have the ability to pay forward an amount to be collected by the first miner who successfully extends their branch, giving them the power to influence the incentives for mining. We formulate a stochastic game for the study of such incentives and show that with this added option, smaller miners can guarantee that the best response of even substantially more powerful miners is to follow the expected behavior intended by the protocol designer.

DOI: 10.1145/3308558.3313740

Authors: Elias Koutsoupias, Philip Lazos, Foluso Ogunlana, Paolo Serafino

Institution: University of Oxford

Language: English

Topic: Blockchain Technology Applications and Security

Subfield: Information Systems

Field: Computer Science

Domain: Physical Sciences

Open Access status: gold

OpenAlex ID: W2912385454

FWCI: 3.185

Cites: 18

Cited by: 22

Related to: 10