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A Dynamic Perspective of the Association between Shareholder Rights and Firm Value

Year: 2008
Type: preprint
Abstract: In this study, I employ a dynamic approach to re-examine the association between firm value and the shareholder-rights-based Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) governance index and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) entrenchment index. Using static approaches, recent empirical studies provide quite mixed results: Chi (2005) argues that stronger shareholder rights may reduce agency costs, leading to an increase in the value of the firm. In contrast, Lehn, Patro, and Zhao (2006) find that causality runs from the market-to-book ratio (their proxy for firm value) to the governance index and the entrenchment index, not vice versa. In a dynamic context, I find that firms with stronger shareholder rights are more likely to have a higher firm value. Further, my Granger causality test for panel data indicates that the Granger causation seems to run from governance index to firm value, but not vice-versa. My empirical evidence also shows that using static model specifications in the literature to examine the causality, if any, is problematic in this specific area.
Institution: Deakin University
Language: English
Subfield: Finance
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2912920767
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