Transition from Gaussian to Levy distributions of stochastic payoff variations in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game
Year: 2007
Type: article
Abstract: We study the impact of stochastic payoff variations with different distributions on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game. We find that Gaussian-distributed payoff variations are most successful in promoting cooperation irrespective of the temptation to defect. In particular, the facilitative effect of noise on the evolution of cooperation decreases steadily as the frequency of rare events increases. Findings are explained via an analysis of local payoff ranking violations. The relevance of results for economics and sociology is discussed.
Source: Physical Review E
Author: Matjaž Perc
Institution: University of Maribor
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1964007387
