Work

It’s Not a Game: Accurate Representation with Toy Models

Year: 2019

Type: article

Abstract: Drawing on ‘interpretational’ accounts of scientific representation, I argue that the use of so-called ‘toy models’ provides no particular philosophical puzzle. More specifically; I argue that once one gives up the idea that models are accurate representations of their targets only if they are appropriately similar, then simple and highly idealized models can be accurate in the same way that more complex models can be. Their differences turn on trading precision for generality, but, if they are appropriately interpreted, toy models should nevertheless be considered accurate representations. A corollary of my discussion is a novel way of thinking about idealization more generally: idealized models may distort features of their targets, but they needn’t misrepresent them.

Source: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axz010

Author: James Nguyen

Institutions: University of London, School of Advanced Study, Institute of Philosophy, University College London, London School of Economics and Political Science

Language: English

Topic: Philosophy and History of Science

Subfield: History and Philosophy of Science

Field: Arts and Humanities

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green