Year: 2019
Type: article
Abstract: In recent years, there has been growing interest in studying evolutionary games with environmental feedback. Previous studies exclusively focus on two-player games. However, extension to multi-player game is needed to study problems such as microbial cooperation and crowdsourcing collaborations. Here, we study coevolutionary public goods games where strategies coevolve with the multiplication factors of group cooperation. Asymmetry can arise in such environmental feedback, where games organized by focal cooperators may have a different efficiency than the ones by defectors. Our analysis shows that coevolutionary dynamics with asymmetrical environmental feedback can yield oscillatory convergence to persistent cooperation, if the relative changing speed of cooperators' multiplication factor is above a certain threshold. Our work provides useful insights into sustaining group cooperation in a changing world.
Source: Europhysics Letters (EPL)
Authors: Yanxuan Shao, Xin Wang, Feng Fu
Institutions: Nankai University, Dartmouth College, Beihang University
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W2942324491