Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms without Money for Scheduling
Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: . We consider the scheduling problem when no payments are allowed and the machines are bound by their declarations. We are interested in a notion of incentive compatibility, stronger than the (standard) strategy-proofness, termed obviously strategy-proof (OSP), and explore its possibilities and limitations. OSP formalizes the concept of strategy-proofness for agents/machines with a certain kind of bounded rationality by making an agent’s incentives to act truthfully obvious in some sense: roughly speaking, the worst possible outcome after providing information about her true type is at least as good as the best possible outcome after misreporting information about her type. Under the weaker constraint of strategyroofness, Koutsoupias [ Theoret. Comput. Syst., 54 (2014), pp. 375–387] proves a tight approximation ratio of [Formula: see text] for the makespan for one task, under the monitoring paradigm. We wish to examine how this guarantee is affected by the strengthening of the incentive compatibility constraint. The main message of our work is that there is essentially no worsening of the approximation guarantee corresponding to the significant strengthening of the guarantee of incentive compatibility from strategy-proofness to OSP, as long as the mechanism designer can implement a particular notion of monitoring. To achieve this, we introduce the notion of max-monitoring and prove that weaker monitoring frameworks do not suffice, thus providing a complete picture of OSP with monitoring in the context of scheduling a task without money.
DOI: 10.1137/23m1563578
Authors: Maria Kyropoulou, Carmine Ventre
Institutions: University of Essex, King's College London
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2945290689