Year: 2018
Type: article
Abstract: We consider the general problem of resource sharing in societal networks, consisting of interconnected communication, transportation, energy, and other networks important to the functioning of society. Participants in such network need to take decisions daily, both on the quantity of resources to use as well as the periods of usage. With this in mind, we discuss the problem of incentivizing users to behave in such a way that society as a whole benefits. To perceive societal level impact, such incentives may take the form of rewarding users with lottery tickets based on good behavior and periodically conducting a lottery to translate these tickets into real rewards. We will pose the user decision problem as a mean field game and the incentives question as one of trying to select a good mean field equilibrium (MFE). In such a framework, each agent (a participant in the societal network) takes a decision based on an assumed distribution of actions of his/her competitors and the incentives provided by the social planner. The system is said to be at MFE if the agent’s action is a sample drawn from the assumed distribution. We will show the existence of such an MFE under general settings, and also illustrate how to choose an attractive equilibrium using as an example demand-response in the (smart) electricity network.
DOI: 10.1145/3232076
Institutions: Texas A&M University, University of Michigan
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: bronze
Awards: CAREER: Beyond Akamai and BitTorrent: Information and Decision Dynamics in Content Distribution Networks, Collaborative Research: EARS: Creating an Ecosystem for Enhanced Spectrum Utilization Through Dynamic Market Mechanisms, Spectrum Sharing in the Shadow of Uncertainty: Risk, Incentives and Investment, A control-theoretic framework for analysis and design of networked systems with strategic agents via structured strategies, EAGER: A Dynamical Systems Approach to Modeling and Controlling Responsive Demand in Electric Power Systems, III: Small: Inferring first movers in large-scale socio-technical networks, Collaborative Research: EARS: Creating an Ecosystem for Enhanced Spectrum Utilization Through Dynamic Market Mechanisms, Collaborative Research: RIPS Type 2: Strategic Analysis and Design of Robust and Resilient Interdependent Power and Communications Networks, Collaborative Research: CyberSEES: Coupon Incentive-based Risk Aware Demand Response in Smart Grid
OpenAlex ID: W2964038505
