Work

Optimal Algorithm for Bayesian Incentive-Compatible Exploration

Year: 2019

Type: conference-paper

Abstract: We consider a social planner faced with a stream of myopic selfish agents. The goal of the social planner is to maximize the social welfare, however, it is limited to using only information asymmetry (regarding previous outcomes) and cannot use any monetary incentives. The planner recommends actions to agents, but her recommendations need to be Bayesian Incentive Compatible to be followed by the agents.

Source: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC)

DOI: 10.1145/3328526.3329581

Authors: Lee Cohen, Yishay Mansour

Institutions: Tel Aviv University, Google (Israel)

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Applications

Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research

Field: Decision Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W2949859577

FWCI: 1.802

Cites: 18

Cited by: 11

Related to: 10