Year: 2012
Type: preprint
Abstract: We study a more powerful variant of false-name manipulation in Internet auctions: an agent can submit multiple false-name bids, but then, once the allocation and payments have been decided, withdraw some of her false-name identities (have some of her false-name identities refuse to pay). While these withdrawn identities will not obtain the items they won, their initial presence may have been beneficial to the agent's other identities. We define a mechanism to be false-name-proof with withdrawal (FNPW) if the aforementioned manipulation is never beneficial. FNPW is a stronger condition than false-name-proofness (FNP).
Source: arXiv (Cornell University)
Authors: Guo, Mingyu, Conitzer, Vincent
Institutions: University of Liverpool, Duke University
Language: English
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2952974945