Year: 2017
Type: article
Abstract: Here is laid the body of Jonathan Swift, Doctor of Divinity, Dean of this cathedral Church, Where fierce indignation can no longer Lacerate his heart.Go, traveller, and imitate if you can This vigorous Champion of Liberty. Epitaph of Jonathan SwiftIndignation seems a kind of anger, but what kind?Both anger and indignation are responses to offences, but what, if anything, makes the difference between them?I shall consider these two questions in the light of a view of the emotions for which I have previously argued (Drummond 2004(Drummond , 2006(Drummond , 2009(Drummond , 2013(Drummond , 2017)).On this view, which is a modification of Edmund Husserl's account, the emotions involve feelings that can be considered in two respects.First, they are sensory states that register physiological changes in the body.Second, they are intentional feelings that (1) apprehend the affective or value-attribute of the thing or situation, which attribute is -to use language popularized by Anthony Kenny ([1963] 2003, 132) -the 'formal' object of the emotion, and (2) thereby grasp the 'material', that is, the concrete or particular, object of the emotion as positively or negatively valued or, perhaps, as indifferent.The emotion-type and its evaluative sense are founded on an underlying cognitive sense as grasped by a subject with a particular physiological constitution; a particular experiential history; and particular interests, concerns, and commitments.I distinguish mere intentional feelings from emotions in virtue of the degree of determination of the underlying Chapter 2Anger and Indignation
Author: John J. Drummond
Language: English
Topic: Emotions and Moral Behavior
Subfield: Social Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2960939567