Work

Cooperation in Stochastic Games: A Prisoner's Dilemma Experiment

Year: 2017

Type: article

Abstract: This experiment investigates a stochastic version of the infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma. The stochastic element introduces the importance of beliefs about the future for supporting cooperation as well as cooperation and defection on the equilibrium path. There is more cooperation in treatments where beliefs predict cooperation after subjects gain sufficient experience. There is some evidence for cooperation and defection as predicted by equilibrium, but there is stronger evidence for behavior conditioning on past actions that is not consistent with equilibrium play. In particular, subjects continue cooperating even when it is no longer possible in equilibrium for the realized game.

Source: Experimental Economics

DOI: 10.1007/s10683-019-09619-w

Author: Andrew Kloosterman

Institution: University of Virginia

Language: English

Topic: Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

Funder: National Science Foundation

Award: Doctoral Dissertation Research: Cooperation in Stochastic Games: A Prisoner's Dilemma Experiment