The normative decision theory in economics: a philosophy of science perspective. The case of the expected utility theory
Year: 2019
Type: article
Abstract: This article analyses how normative decision theory is understood by economists. The paradigmatic example of normative decision theory, discussed in the article, is the expected utility theory. It has been suggested that the status of the expected utility theory has been ambiguous since early in its history. The theory has been treated as descriptive, normative, or both. This observation is the starting point for the analysis presented here. The text discusses various ways in which economists and philosophers of economics have conceptualized the normative status of the expected utility theory, and it shows that none is satisfactory from the point of view of philosophy of science.
Source: Journal of Economic Methodology
Author: Magdalena Małecka
Institution: University of Helsinki
Language: English
Subfield: General Decision Sciences
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
Funders: European Commission, Academy of Finland
Award: G1263579318
OpenAlex ID: W2964067231
