Year: 2018
Type: conference-paper
Abstract: Participatory budgeting is one of the exciting developments in deliberative grassroots democracy. We concentrate on approval elections and propose proportional representation axioms in participatory budgeting, by generalizing relevant axioms for approval-based multi-winner elections. We observe a rich landscape with respect to the computational complexity of identifying proportional budgets and computing such, and present budgeting methods that satisfy these axioms by identifying budgets that are representative to the demands of vast segments of the voters.
DOI: 10.65109/qhuq3213
Authors: Haris Aziz, Barton E. Lee, Nimrod Talmon
Institutions: UNSW Sydney, Data61, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2964079046