Work

Strategyproof Mechanism for Two Heterogeneous Facilities with Constant Approximation Ratio

Year: 2019

Type: preprint

Abstract: In this paper, we study the two-facility location game on a line with optional preference where the acceptable set of facilities for each agent could be different and an agent's cost is his distance to the closest facility within his acceptable set. The objective is to minimize the total cost of all agents while achieving strategyproofness. We design a deterministic strategyproof mechanism for the problem with approximation ratio of 2.75, improving upon the earlier best ratio of n/2+1.

Source: arXiv (Cornell University)

DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.1907.08918

Authors: Li, Minming, Lu, Pinyan, Yao, Yuhao, Zhang, Jialin

Institutions: City University of Hong Kong, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Institute of Computing Technology

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W2964155480

Cites: 41

Cited by: 4

Related to: 10