Work

Analyzing control flow integrity with LLVM-CFI

Year: 2019

Type: conference-paper

Abstract: Control-flow hijacking attacks are used to perform malicious computations. Current solutions for assessing the attack surface after a control flow integrity (CFI) policy was applied can measure only indirect transfer averages in the best case without providing any insights w.r.t. the absolute calltarget reduction per callsite, and gadget availability. Further, tool comparison is underdeveloped or not possible at all. CFI has proven to be one of the most promising protections against control flow hijacking attacks, thus many efforts have been made to improve CFI in various ways. However, there is a lack of systematic assessment of existing CFI protections.

Source: Annual Computer Security Applications Conference

DOI: 10.1145/3359789.3359806

Authors: Paul Muntean, Matthias Neumayer, Zhiqiang Lin, Gang Tan, Jens Grossklags, Claudia Eckert

Institutions: Technical University of Munich, The Ohio State University, Pennsylvania State University

Language: English

Topic: Security and Verification in Computing

Subfield: Artificial Intelligence

Field: Computer Science

Domain: Physical Sciences

Open Access status: bronze

Funders: National Science Foundation, Office of Naval Research

Awards: SaTC: CORE: Medium: Collaborative: Threat-Aware Defense: Evaluating Threats for Continuous Improvement, G4504108201, G5486092921, CAREER: A Dual-VM Binary Code Reuse Based Framework for Automated Virtual Machine Introspection, G8876996369