Fair Division with Bounded Sharing.
Year: 2019
Type: preprint
Abstract: A set of objects is to be divided fairly among agents with different tastes, modeled by additive value functions. If the objects cannot be shared, so that each of them must be entirely allocated to a single agent, then fair division may not exist. How many objects must be shared between two or more agents in order to attain a fair division? The paper studies various notions of fairness, such as proportionality, envy-freeness and equitability. It also studies consensus division, in which each agent assigns the same value to all bundles --- a notion that is useful in truthful fair division mechanisms. It proves upper bounds on the number of required sharings. However, it shows that finding the minimum number of sharings is, in general, NP-hard even for generic instances. Many problems remain open.
Source: arXiv (Cornell University)
Author: Erel Segal-Halevi
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2991292531