Work

Efficiency and Envy-freeness in Fair Division of Indivisible Goods: Logical Representation and Complexity

Year: 2008

Type: article

Abstract: We consider the problem of allocating fairly a set of indivisible goods among agents from the point of view of compact representation and computational complexity. We start by assuming that agents have dichotomous preferences expressed by propositional formulae. We express efficiency and envy-freeness in a logical setting, which reveals unexpected connections to nonmonotonic reasoning. Then we identify the complexity of determining whether there exists an efficient and envy-free allocation, for several notions of efficiency, when preferences are represented in a succinct way (as well as restrictions of this problem). We first study the problem under the assumption that preferences are dichotomous, and then in the general case.

Source: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research

DOI: 10.1613/jair.2467

Authors: S. Bouveret, J. Lang

Institutions: Office National d'Études et de Recherches Aérospatiales, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Institut de Recherche en Informatique de Toulouse

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: diamond

Funder: Agence Nationale de la Recherche

Award: G766923599