Work

The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties

Year: 2002
Type: article
Abstract: Intellectual property treaties create two types of obligations: for national treatment of foreign inventors and for certain harmonized protections. I investigate both the incentive to join such treaties and the incentive to harmonize. As compared to an equilibrium in which the countries' policy makers make independent choices, harmonization will generally strengthen protections. This analysis recognizes that public sponsorship is sometimes an efficient alternative to intellectual property. However, there are no institutions to harmonize public spending, and there are no international mechanisms to repatriate the spillovers it generates. As a consequence, there may be too little public sponsorship and too much intellectual property. A country's inclination to strengthen harmonized protections will depend both on its innovativeness (positively) and on the size of its domestic market (negatively).
Author: S. Scotchmer
Language: English
Subfield: Law
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2996443114
FWCI: 105.7
Cites: 33
Cited by: 178
Related to: 10