Year: 2019
Type: book-chapter
Abstract: According to Russellian panpsychism, familiar conscious experiences are constituted by phenomenal properties that might be unfamiliar, namely, phenomenal properties that categorically ground dispositional properties posited by fundamental physics. In this entry, we discuss two challenges to that theory: that it fails to adequately integrate consciousness into physical causation ( Howell 2015 ); and that its alleged advantages over traditional dualist and traditional physicalist theories are illusory ( Kind 2015 ). We argue that neither challenge is insurmountable.
Source: Routledge eBooks
Parent work: The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism
Authors: Torin Alter, Sam Coleman
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2997361186
