Situational systematicity: A role for schema in understanding the differences between abstract and concrete concepts
Year: 2020
Type: article
Abstract: concepts differ from concrete concepts in a number of ways. Here, we focus on what we refer to as situational systematicity: The objects and relations that constitute an abstract concept (e.g., justice) are more dispersed through space and time than are the objects and relations that typically constitute a concrete concept (e.g., chair); a larger set of objects and relations might potentially constitute an abstract concept than a concrete one; and exactly which objects and relations constitute a concept is likely more context-dependent for abstract than for concrete concepts. We thus refer to abstract concepts as having low situational systematicity. We contend that situational systematicity, rather than abstractness per se, may be a critical determinant of the cognitive, behavioral, and neural phenomena typically associated with concepts. We also contend that investigating concepts through the lens of schema provides insight into the situation-based dynamics of concept learning and representation, and into the functional significance of the interactions between brain regions that make up the schema control network.
Source: Cognitive Neuropsychology
Authors: Charles P. Davis, Gerry T. M. Altmann, Eiling Yee
Language: English
Subfield: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2997785823