A technical critique of the free energy principle as presented in "Life as we know it" and related works
Year: 2020
Type: preprint
Abstract: We summarize the argument in Friston (2013,https://doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2013.0475) and highlight some technical errors. We
also discuss how these errors affect the very similar Friston (2014,
https://doi.org/10.1109/JPROC.2014.2306251) and, where appropriate, mention
consequences for the newer proposals in Friston (2019, arXiv:1906.10184v1 ) and
Parr et al. (2019,
https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/full/10.1098/rsta.2019.0159). The errors
call into question the purported interpretation that the internal coordinates
of every system with a Markov blanket will appear to engage in Bayesian
inference. In particular, in addition to highlighting the implicit restriction
to linear models, we identify three formal errors in the main argument of
Friston (2013): The first concerns the rewriting of the equations of motion of
systems with Markov blankets which turns out not to be generally correct. We
prove the non-equivalence with a counterexample that exhibits a Markov blanket
but does not satisfy the rewritten equations. Our counterexample also
invalidates the corresponding (but more general) rewritten equations in the
more recent Friston (2019). The second error concerns the Free Energy Lemma
itself, which we prove, by counterexample, to be wrong in general. The third is
the claim that the Free Energy Lemma, when it does hold, implies equality of
variational density and ergodic conditional density. The interpretation in
terms of Bayesian inference hinges on this point, and we hence conclude that it
is unjustified. Additionally, we highlight that the definitions of the Markov
blanket in Friston (2013) and Parr et al. (2019) are not equivalent and that
the assumptions in Parr et al. (2019) may be too strong to allow for meaningful
interpretation.
Source: arXiv (Cornell University)
Authors: Martin Biehl, Felix A. Pollock, Ryota Kanai
Language: English
Subfield: Cognitive Neuroscience
Field: Neuroscience
Domain: Life Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W3004613626
