Silencing Without Uptake
Year: 2021
Type: book-chapter
Abstract: Catharine MacKinnon has claimed that some pornography “silences” women. Some work in feminist analytical philosophy suggests it does so by depriving them of the capacity to perform certain speech acts, such as (and most prominently) the speech act of sexual refusal. This has been termed the silencing of “illocutionary disablement.” Critics object that this silencing claim involves a contentious thesis about the success conditions of speech acts such as sexual refusal: that the auditor’s comprehension, or “uptake,” of the speaker’s intent is required for the speech act to come off. I try to show that the illocutionary disablement claim can do without the uptake condition as it has heretofore been formulated. Even if audience uptake is not a success condition for each individual act of sexual refusal, reciprocity of a certain kind is still a condition of women’s continuing ability to engage the refusal illocution. When pornography disrupts the conditions for that reciprocity it will effectuate illocutionary disablement. I also consider whether the illocutionary disablement under consideration here is properly thought of as “silencing.”
Source: Oxford University Press eBooks
Parent work: Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law Volume 4
Author: Kate Greasley*
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W4205817491
