Realism and the language dependence of the external world : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy at Massey University
Year: 1985
Type: dissertation
Abstract: This Thesis falls loosely into 2 Parts. \n \nIn Part 1 (Chs.\t1-4) a certain version of the view generally called "Realism" is put forward.\tThis Realism is a view that can take either of two forms, one weak or soft, the other hard or strong. The first form states that there is an external world, which we experience and which influences language.\t\tThe second form states that there is an external world, which is mirrored in consciousness and which is also mirrored in language.\tThat is, the contents of consciousness and the contents of language correspond exactly to an absolute external world.\tThis second stronger version (which I call "Metaphysical Realism") is refuted in Chapters 2-4. \n \nRefuting it, however, still leaves us with the first view intact.\tIn the rest of the thesis I argue that this first weaker version of Realism is essentially correct.\tThis is because: \n \na.\tObjects do indeed exist. (Ch.\t5) \n \n \nb.\tAt least part of what we do when we say we see X is\trefer to a genuine experience of X. (Chs 6 & 7) \n \nc.\tIn a certain sense the world is known non-linguistically. (Ch.\t8) \n \nThe final chapter, Ch.\t9, is designed to show how language \n \ninfluences what might loosely be called the "External World".\tHence we end up with a genuine "Realism" which is yet in a sense "language dependent", for this "real world" is formed by language which then reports on the world so formed.
Author: Richard John Perrott
Language: English
Subfield: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W3009989366