Year: 2020
Type: article
Abstract: We replicate the 2018 study by Hauser and examine whether director appointments impact firm performance by exploiting the exogenous reduction in board appointments generated by mergers that terminate target boards. Using an extended sample, we find increases in return on assets and Tobin’s q for firms with a reduction in board appointments (i.e., treated firms), confirming the results in Hauser’s study. In further analysis, we find greater improvements in firm performance when the target and treated firms are from different industries than if they are from the same industry. The results further demonstrate that director appointments influence firm performance via a workload channel.
Source: Accounting and Finance
DOI: 10.1111/acfi.12631
Authors: Sorin Daniliuc, Lingwei Li, Marvin Wee
Institution: Australian National University
Language: English
Subfield: Accounting
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W3011017170