True Griceanism: Filling the Gaps in Callender and Cohen’s Account of Scientific Representation
Year: 2020
Type: article
Abstract: Callender and Cohen have proposed to apply a “Gricean strategy” to the constitution problem of scientific representation. They suggest that scientific representation can be reduced to stipulation by epistemic agents. This account has been criticized for not making a distinction between symbolic and epistemic representation and not taking into account the communal aspects of representation. These criticisms would not apply if Grice’s actual strategy were properly employed. I transpose Grice’s strategy to epistemic representation. The main novelty of the resulting account is a distinction between contextual representational use and general representational status, which I address using the notion of indexicality.
Source: Philosophy of Science
DOI: 10.1086/712882
Author: Quentin Ruyant
Institution: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
Language: English
Subfield: History and Philosophy of Science
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W3011233152